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USE OF MOCK-UPS IN TELEVISION ADVERTISING
UPHELD
Colgate-Palmolive Company v. Federal Trade Commission
310 F2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962)
The Federal Trade Commission, acting under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,' issued a cease and desist order against television
commercials which advertised the "moisturizing" qualities of Colgate-
Palmolive "Rapid Shave." The commercial involved a demonstration of the
product where it was applied to what appeared to be coarse sandpaper. The
"sandpaper" was shaved clean with a safety razor immediately after the
application. The "sandpaper" was in fact a mock-up or simulation composed
of sand on plexiglass. If actual sandpaper were used in this demonstration,
it would appear to be simply colored paper, due to the technical problems of
television photography. According to the court of appeals, the mock-up was
misrepresentation within the prohibition of the Act, and a cease and desist
order was justified. However, the court set aside the FTC's order as being
too broad on the basis, inter alia, that it could be interpreted to prohibit the
use of television mock-ups or substitutions of any sort, and the court found
that this was in fact the intention and policy of the FTC. 2 The court was
unable to find any misrepresentation to the viewer in a case where a substitu-
tion was made solely to compensate for the inherent limitations of television
photography.3
This case is the first on the subject of television mock-ups to reach the
federal courts, although the question has been before the Commission often.4
1 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1958).
2 Colgate-Palmolive Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 310 F.2d 89, 93 n.6
(1st Cir. 1962). To test the Commission's position, the court proposed the following
hypothetical situation to counsel for the Commission: A prominent person who actually
liked "Lipsom's Tea" was photographed while drinking colored water which appeared
on the screen to be tea. When asked if the Commission would consider the use of
colored water to be misconduct, counsel answered that the Commission's position was
that it would, since the viewer was led to believe he was seeing tea when in fact he was
not.
3 Id.
4 79 B .A. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., B-1 (1963). The rigidity of the FTC
policy against any sort of deception can be traced back to November 2, 1959 when
Chairman Earl W. Kintner stated the Commission's intent to "turn off the spigot of chi-
canery at its source with the handiest wrench that will fit the task." Results of this
policy change were immediate. On November 22, 1959 a complaint against the "protec-
tive shield" advertisement for "Colgate Dental Cream" was issued, based on deception.
On December 14, 1959 a complaint was filed alleging that a demonstration of the filter
in "Life" cigarettes did not prove what it purported to prove, and a consent order was
issued on February 24, 1960. On January 15, 1960 four complaints were announced
against deceptive demonstrations by the manufacturers and advertising agencies of
nationally advertised products, including the complaint resulting in the instant case.
Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Docket 7736). Another complaint followed on March 24, 1960
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The policy of thE FTC against substitutions or demonstrations which are
not genuine, even though they portray to the viewer an accurate impression
of the qualities of the product, was held to be unwarranted. The court
reasoned that if there had been no misstatement of the facts about the
product, or misrepresentation of its appearance, the use of a substituted
material or mock-up should not be illegal per se.5
The purpose of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is two-
fold: to protect the public against misleading advertisements; 6 and, to
eliminate methods of competition which are considered to be unfair.7 Pre-
sumably, the same standards apply to all advertisers. Consequently, if there
is a misrepresentation by one advertiser which induces a segment of the
public to purchase the product as a result of the misrepresentation, there is
unfair competition in that sales have been lost by competing firms who have
conformed to the standards set forth by the FTC." In addition, the buyers
of the product who relied on the advertisement did not receive what they
thought they were buying, and were injured to the extent of their reliance.9
Through the Wheeler-Lea Amendment in 1938, the emphasis on protec-
tion of competition was abandoned.?0 In adding the words "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices" to the Act, the amendment codified the judicial trend
that the Act should afford direct protection to the buying public as well."
The position of the FTC is supported by several arguments, and there
are certain policy reasons why an affirmance of that position might well be
advantageous to all concerned. Advertising in general, particularly through
the medium of television, has become a powerful force in our economy and
in the lives of the American people. The purpose of advertising is to influence
the public to buy the product advertised, and the motivation on which
advertisers rely is not generally need or utility. Often appeal to the desire
against Eversharp, Inc. (Docket 7811), alleging that a demonstration of competitive
razors cutting the surface of a boxing glove unduly frightened prospective buyers of the
competitive razors. On June 26, 1960 a complaint alleging a substitution in a demonstra-
tion of a competing product was issued against Carter Products, Inc. (Docket 7943),
involving "Rise Shaving Cream," and the case is now pending before the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Most of these cases have resulted in consent orders, without
admitting any violation of the law.
5 Colgate-Palmolive Company v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 2, at 94.
6 Aronberg v. Federal Trade Commission, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
7 Butterick Pub. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 85 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1936).
8 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149 (1942); Federal Trade
Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
9 Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
1o Moore, "Deceptive Trade Practices and the Federal Trade Commission," 28
Tenn. L. Rev. 493, 497 (1961).
11 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1952) provides:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce are declared unlawful.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937); Note, "The Regulation of
Advertising," 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, 1022 (1956). See generally, Barnes, "False Ad-
vertising," 23 Ohio St. L.J. 597 (1962).
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for social success or prestige is the basis of the "pitch.""2 Thus the influence
on the public character may be somewhat less than beneficial.
Since a substitution or mock-up is, in the narrowest sense, a mis-
representation as to what is actually being viewed, why should the FTC or
the courts extend to advertisers the privilege of making this misrepresenta-
tion? There is certainly no right to disseminate misleading advertisements. 13
In addition, the problems of enforcement of the Act would be greatly simpli-
fied by an insistence on genuineness, since there would be no critical judg-
ments required to determine whether the substitutions or mock-ups, if
allowed, created an accurate net impression in the minds of the viewing
public. If the advertisers have problems in photography or in any other re-
gard, why should they be allowed to resort to misrepresentations in order
to solve them?
From the standpoint of the companies who are selling the products,
there is good reason to believe that from a long-range point of view, a strict
policy against substitutions would increase, rather than decrease, sales. If
the public were made aware of the fact that advertising was required to
be absolutely accurate and genuine, public confidence in television demonstra-
tions should eventually improve. It is very likely that there is a large and
skeptical body of the American people who pay no attention to television
advertisements unless it is absolutely unavoidable. If properly handled
and made public, the fact that advertisements must be genuine or not be
shown would tend to influence these skeptics to be more disposed to the
products shown on television.
For good reasons, the court was not persuaded by such arguments in
the instant case. Regardless of the medium employed in the dissemination of
an advertisement, the test of falsity is the net impression which the advertise-
ment is likely to make on the general public.' 4 Section 15 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act defines the term false advertisement as meaning an
advertisement "which is misleading in a material respect." (Emphasis
added.)15 Keeping these two principles in mind, the issue should be confined
to the question of whether or not an advertisement is materially misleading
to the viewing public where any substitution is used in demonstrating the
product, even though there is no exaggeration of the qualities of the product.
In the instant case, the FTC took the position that a sponsor takes liberties
with the truth which amount to misconduct when the viewer is led to believe,
for example, that he is seeing iced tea when in fact he is seeing colored water,
even though the colored water appears on the viewer's television set exactly
as iced tea would appear on the dinner table.' 6 It- is difficult to see how an
12 E.g., The current men's hair oil advertisement to the effect that if you use "a
little dab" of "Bryl Creme" "the girls will all pursue ya."
13 E.F. Drew & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956).
14 Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d
676 (2d Cir. 1944).
15 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1952).
16 Colgate-Palmolive Company v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 2.
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advertisement which presents a completely accurate impression of the appear-
ance and capabilities of a product can cause anyone viewing it to be misled.
The fact that the viewer believes he is seeing iced tea or sandpaper, when
in fact he is seeing something else, would certainly not influence his decision
to purchase the product if it were known that the qualities of the product
had been accurately portrayed. The test as to the falsity of an advertisement
deals with the subjective effect on the viewer, and it is not significant in that
respect, that the mock-up at which the camera is directed is not precisely
what the viewer is led to believe.
The public is entitled to buy what it thinks it is buying.17 However,
where a mock-up is used merely to demonstrate qualities which the product
actually possesses, the purchasing public does get precisely that which was
apparently advertised, and neither buyer nor competitor has been injured by
the substitution.
17 In the matter of Hutchinson Chem. Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1942 (1959).
